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Abstract 
Does electoral fraud encourage citizen post-electoral political protest? Much of the 
scholarship on electoral protests has focused on nationally-prominent street rallies occurring 
in national capitals.  By contrast, the proclivity of citizens to pick up on fraud perpetrated in 
the sub-national region in which they reside and vote, and to challenge it by engaging in 
street rallies in provincial towns, has remained under-researched. To nuance existing 
scholarship, we analyse the likelihood that local citizens would pick up on electoral 
irregularities perpetrated in their locality / region and engage in post-electoral protest. 
Specifically, we analyse author-gathered data for some 5,000 regional protests, and voting 
results for 95,415 precincts in Russia’s 2012 Presidential elections. These data, which we 
aggregate at the level of the regions, cover virtually all of the eighty-five constituent subjects 
(regions) of the Russian Federation. We find that local fraud is associated with post-electoral 
protests. Our analysis has important theoretical and policy implications. Protests that not only 
target specific issues like fraud, but show awareness of specific precincts in which it had been 
perpetrated, and can name and shame its concrete perpetrators, can be much more effective 
than those where blame attribution is vague and generic. 
 
* Associate Professor 
International Relations Department 
London School of Economics & Political Science (t.lankina@lse.ac.uk) 
 
** Lecturer in Industrial and Managerial Economics 
Nottingham University Business School (rodion.skovoroda@nottingham.ac.uk) 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Does fraud in competitive authoritarian states galvanize post-electoral protest? This question 
goes to the root of the debates about sources of competitive authoritarian regime survival or 
demise (Diamond 2002; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky 
and Way 2010; Schedler 2002; Wolchik 2012; Donno 2013a,b; Thompson and Kuntz 2006). 
Yet despite the known implications of street contention against “electoral atrocities” 
(Lehoucq 2003) for regime uncertainty, there have been few studies analysing the effect of 
electoral fraud on post-electoral protest mobilization. A growing body of studies have 
explored why some states are more or less likely to perpetrate fraud, mostly with reference to 
institutionalized aspects of the electoral process, such as electoral rules; electoral 
commissions; election monitoring; courts; and party systems (Birch 2007; Chernykh and 
Svolik 2015; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Donno 2013a; Herron 2010; Kelley 2011; Lehoucq 
2003; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Pastor 1999). On the other hand, established social 
movement literature (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Tarrow 1996) has rarely analysed 
fraud as a “focal point” (Tucker 2007) for protests or as a survival instrument of competitive 
authoritarian regimes. Recent protests in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Latin America 
have underlined the extra-electoral (Bunce and Wolchik 2011) power of mass protesters in 
challenging electoral irregularities. Some studies have sought to model the interaction 
between the two variables; these however have remained under-specified (Fearon 2011; 
Simpser 2013).  
 One under-theorized dimension of the interactions between fraud and protests that we 
address in this paper is the ability of citizens to find out about fraud perpetrated in the 
particular regions in which they reside and vote, and to act upon this information by taking to 
the streets and protesting. Our paper seeks to redress this omission. Our key concerns are 
whether protesters would show sensitivity to local fraud and engage in protest to challenge it, 
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as opposed to solely responding to general signals about “national” electoral misconduct that 
they might pick up from national media broadcasts. Much of the scholarship on electoral 
mobilizations has analysed national-level citizen protests targeting “autocrats,” “incumbents,” 
or “the regime” and the effects of such nationally-prominent mobilizations on the stability of 
autocracies. We conjecture that such a preoccupation with national-level protests is somewhat 
misplaced considering that much of the fraud is local in the sense that it is perpetrated by 
precinct-level officials who are in turn accountable to, or can otherwise be influenced by, 
officials in specific sub-national regions. In turn, in any given region, we would expect civil 
society groups and political opposition activists to seek to engage in election monitoring 
activities in order to expose irregularities and to disseminate information about them to the 
local citizenry. We therefore expect protests to be contingent upon signals about sub-national 
electoral malpractice—that is, fraud perpetrated in specific regions or localities—because 
citizens are often aware of local manipulations, and can even name and shame individuals 
perpetrating them.  
 Our analysis has important theoretical and policy implications. Protests that not only 
target particular issues like fraud, but show awareness of the specific precincts, towns, and 
regions in which it had been perpetrated, and can name and shame its concrete perpetrators, 
can be much more effective than those where targets are vague and generic (Javeline 2003; 
Snow, E. Burke Rochford et al. 1986). If citizens are prepared to protest locally-perpetrated 
fraud, the national leaders’ potential to rely on their local clients to deliver pro-incumbent 
results in future electoral contests could be compromised. This is because protests may 
generate a variety of risks and uncertainties for low-level officials engaged in the mechanics 
of fraud. Alternatively, local protests might well prompt the national centre to engage in 
citizen repression to deter future protests. These are important considerations that might 
illuminate longer-term processes of competitive authoritarian regime erosion or 
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consolidation. At the same time, the policy community promoting free and fair elections 
worldwide may want to consider sub-national citizen protests as a barometer of regional 
variations in electoral misconduct, and therefore engage in greater capacity building for local 
citizen monitoring of elections at a sub-national level. 
 To test our assumptions, we perform sub-national analysis of the effect of fraud on the 
probability of post-electoral protests following Russia’s March 2012 Presidential elections. 
There is substantial evidence that electoral fraud marred successive federal elections 
accompanying Russia’s slide into authoritarianism in the 2000s (Moraski and Reisinger 2003, 
2010). Yet, the 2011-2012 State Duma (Parliamentary) and Presidential elections stood out: 
not only were they accompanied by unprecedented in scale mass protests, but protesters 
rallied around the issue of fraud (Greene 2013; Krastev and Holmes 2012; Shevtsova 2012; 
Smyth, Sobolev et al. 2013). The announcement on 24 September 2011 by then President 
Dmitry Medvedev of the infamous “swap” served as an initial trigger to the protests. 
Vladimir Putin would resume his role as President, interrupted in 2008 due to a constitutional 
limit of two consecutive terms in office, while Medvedev would revert to being Prime 
Minister. The “swap” made farce of the electoral process. Electoral fraud had been allegedly 
perpetrated during both the Parliamentary and Presidential elections that followed (Gel'man 
2013). Four out of six people reportedly believed that the elections, which produced victory 
for the ruling United Russia (UR) Party and returned Putin to the Presidency, had been 
fraudulent (Aron 2013). 
 Although Western media zoomed in on images of crowds on Moscow’s streets, 
similar events were unfolding in Russia’s regions. Numerous press reports corroborate our 
theoretical expectations of the likely effect of fraud on galvanizing protest. For instance, we 
know that protests helped publicise manipulations and served as venues for recruiting 
election monitors: street rallies sported tents where people could sign up as volunteers. We 
5 
 
also know that there was significant heterogeneity in post-electoral protest activism across 
Russia’s regions. Yet, we still lack a nuanced understanding of the spatial dimension of the 
interaction between contentious politics and electoral malpractice. Specifically, we have yet 
to ascertain systematically whether post-electoral protest activism was more intense in 
regions that actually showed a greater propensity to commit fraud, or whether protests ought 
to be regarded simply as proxies for generally higher levels of citizen engagement that in 
Russia—as in many other hybrid regimes—vary from region to region.  
 Our empirical analysis of fraud is based on the application of the last-digit fraud 
detection method (Deckert, Myagkov et al. 2011; Lukinova, Myagkov et al. 2011, Skovoroda 
and Lankina 2016). Considering that vote counts in fair elections should have uniformly 
distributed last digits, the test could identify election counts that are likely tainted with fraud. 
Bernd Beber and Alexandra Scacco (2012) review the literature on the ability of individuals 
to generate random number sequences and suggest that individuals do not select digits with 
equal frequency even when they have strong incentives to randomise properly. When applied 
to turnout counts in four consecutive Russian presidential and parliamentary elections (2003–
2008), the test typically rejects the null hypothesis of uniformly distributed lasts digits 
(Mebane and Kalinin, 2009). A similar test applied to Sweden’s 2002 parliamentary elections 
reveals no deviations from uniform distribution (Beber and Scacco 2012).1  
 For our analysis, we employ data for nearly 5000 regional protests that we compiled 
from the opposition website namarsh.ru, and vote count statistics for 95,415 polling stations 
(for a discussion of the dataset, see (Lankina 2015; Lankina and Voznaya 2015)). To our 
knowledge, other than Graeme Robertson’s (Robertson 2007; 2011) important work on 
Russian protest, which relies on data from alternative sources (Institute of Collective Action; 
Ministry of Interior) and does not analyse fraud, there have been no such attempts to 
systematically gather Russian regional protest data and apply it to analysing fraud. Although 
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Robertson (2013) relies on different sources, there is strong correlation (coefficient of 77%) 
in protest counts among our respective datasets. We discuss the cross-validation in the 
Supporting Information materials (SI). This lends credibility to our data as a reliable tool for 
analysing regional protests.  
 Our analysis supports our expectation that citizens in Russia’s sub-national regions 
were sensitive to signals about fraud perpetrated in their particular regions and were more 
likely to take to the streets and protest in those regions. In the next section, we elaborate upon 
our theoretical framework and generate hypotheses. We then perform statistical analysis. The 
final section concludes with some reflections on the wider implications of our findings. 
 
Theorizing fraud-protests interactions 
We begin our analysis by defining the key terms employed in this paper. For the sake of 
consistency, we apply the label “competitive authoritarian” to refer to Russia’s regime on the 
eve of the March 2012 presidential elections and up to the inauguration of Vladimir Putin to 
serve his third presidential term, in April 2012. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way apply this 
label to regimes in which the opposition can compete for power with the ruling regime 
incumbents or regime-supported parties, but in the context of a playing field that is skewed 
towards the ruling regime (Levitsky and Way 2010; Way and Levitsky 2002). “In 
competitive authoritarian regimes,” they write, “formal democratic institutions are widely 
viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents 
violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet 
conventional minimum standards for democracy” (Way and Levitsky 2002, p. 52). They 
distinguish such regimes from electoral authoritarian (for a discussion of electoral 
authoritarian systems, see (Schedler 2006)) in that the latter system is arguably essentially 
non-competitive. Although the choice of the particular label—electoral authoritarian; 
7 
 
competitive authoritarian; or authoritarian—is contested and is often highly subjective, we 
believe that the label competitive authoritarian is appropriate for the regime in the time frame 
covered by our study. While under both the electoral and competitive authoritarian systems, 
elections allow for opposition parties and candidates to compete for power, there is a 
difference in the degree to which such competition has a mere symbolic nature, as opposed to 
allowing for the possibility of opposition candidate victory in some races. The 2012 
presidential race and the December 2011 State Duma (parliamentary) elections that it 
preceded coincided with the agenda of limited political liberalization of the outgoing 
President Dmitry Medvedev and that came to be known as “managed democracy.” Not only 
was the opposition allowed to contest the race, but considerable effort was made to reassure 
citizens that the electoral process will be transparent. Thus, cameras were installed in 
electoral precincts; and election monitors representing opposition parties were allowed access 
to polling stations (Skovoroda and Lankina 2016). This, of course, as we demonstrate in the 
paper, does not mean that fraud did not occur in the elections; rather, it allowed for the 
possibility of political competition at least in some electoral districts. The turning point in 
Russia’s transition to a consolidated authoritarian system, in our view, came after Putin’s 
victory in the March 2012 presidential race, whereupon the regime proceeded to 
systematically emasculate the political opposition; erode media pluralism; and pursue 
repression against politically-motivated anti-regime street activism.2 
 Because of the vast “menu” (Schedler 2002) of manipulative activities that 
competitive authoritarian regimes pursue in order to stay in power, electoral fraud is likewise 
a notoriously slippery concept. Scholars have distinguished between election-day fraud, or 
interference with balloting, counting, and tabulation of results, and the more “subtle” forms 
of reinforcing incumbent advantage through economic patronage, blackmail, intimidation, 
vote buying, bribery, and other legal and quasi-legal ways of eliminating challengers 
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transcending election day ballot stuffing (Argersinger 1985; Calingaert 2006; Cox and 
Kousser 1981; Daxecker 2012; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Lehoucq 2003; Way and Levitsky 
2002).  In this study we use the terms fraud and manipulation to refer to the two distinct sets 
of activities, respectively. We use the term “misconduct” to refer to both sets of irregularities. 
At the outset, we note that our statistical analysis does not capture electoral manipulations, as 
defined above. Our measure of misconduct only captures a particular type of election-day 
fraud, namely last-digit fraud. Further, we do not make assumptions regarding the relative 
strength and “effectiveness” of pre-election manipulation strategies versus election-day fraud, 
nor do we make assumptions on substitution or, alternatively, complementarity effects that 
are likely to have an impact on strategic choice of individual misconduct types. We assume, 
however, that the extent to which citizens respond to pre-election manipulations (as opposed 
to election-day fraud) is captured by pre-election protest intensity. This makes pre-election 
protest intensity a critical control variable in the analysis below. The impact of election-day 
fraud on protest is, then, isolated by analysing post-electoral change in protest intensity. We 
refer to manipulations when we discuss the literature on the electoral playing field that is 
skewed towards the regime in many Russian regions and in other contexts and to highlight 
the overall political context in which the specific elections that we analyse took place.   
 We define protests as “contentious episode[s]” (Tarrow 1996) during which citizens 
gather in public spaces for a concentrated period of time with the objective of either 
dislodging, or challenging the practices of, a regime and actors and institutions associated 
with it that block citizen influence on political decision making and participation through 
democratic channels. Our definition of protests thus precludes the inclusion of regime-staged 
rallies, for instance, those organised by the Kremlin-sponsored youth group Nashi (Smyth, 
Sobolev et al. 2013). If anything, activities of such regime-sponsored groups, which stage 
often disruptive rallies with the deliberate attempt to intimidate, undermine or otherwise 
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delegitimise the opposition, are more appropriately classified as electoral manipulations 
rather than protests. As Regina Smyth et al. discuss, “The Kremlin utilized these rallies as 
political theater, designed to convey an image of overwhelming support for the president and 
heavily reliant on its control of state media to present its point of view. Pro-Putin rallies 
became campaign venues in which the Kremlin used political symbols—woven into a 
narrative of nationalism and tradition—to define and activate core voters across the 
Federation. The rallies also stigmatized the opposition by defining their demands as foreign 
and illegitimate— claims that were subsequently codified in new laws that could be used to 
imprison opposition activists” (Smyth, Sobolev et al. 2013, p. 24). 
 How likely are citizens to protest against locally-perpetrated electoral misconduct?  
A number of studies have either directly explored the effects of electoral fraud on mass 
contentious politics, or have suggested general causal mechanisms linking electoral 
misconduct and political participation. Scholars however disagree as to whether fraud can 
have a dampening effect on citizen political mobilization and specifically street rallies, or, 
conversely, whether it can galvanize citizens to engage in non-institutionalised forms of 
participation. We begin by discussing the argument that fraud can have a dampening effect 
on anti-regime protests. We struggled to find systematic evidence to support this proposition. 
An important exception is Alberto Simpser’s “cheating big” argument (Simpser 2008, 2013). 
Simpser develops a causal story linking incentives to generate fraudulent super-majorities for 
leaders in competitive authoritarian regimes with political participation. By “cheating big,” 
the argument goes, incumbents are striving to, and often succeed at, creating a psychological 
effect of apathy because of the perception of a pre-determined outcome no matter what 
actions the challengers—be they opposition parties or ordinary citizens—undertake. Simpser 
does address the possibility that “electoral manipulation could backfire” in that “the ruling 
party could face popular unrest” (2013, pp. 24-25). The probability of this scenario, he 
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contends, “depends on the information conveyed by the manipulation. Excessive and blatant 
manipulation can convey the message that the manipulator is strong, while failure to 
manipulate excessively/ blatantly can make the manipulator be publicly perceived as weak,” 
he writes (emphasis original). Accordingly, “popular protests are less likely to arise following 
excessive electoral manipulation than following marginal manipulation” (Simpser 2013, p. 
25). Simpser admits that his statistical finding on the significant association between 
marginal manipulation and protest is tentative given the availability of protest data for a small 
number of countries in his dataset though he also backs his analysis with case studies of 
Russia and Zimbabwe. Recent analyses of the temporally patchy nature of blatant fraud-
inspired mobilizations in Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan would also lend credence to this 
argument (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Tucker 2007).  
 The reverse argument that electoral fraud can spur protests is in tune with the 
assumptions of much of the classic social movement scholarship. While recognizing that 
collective action problems often hamper participation (Lichbach 1995; Olson 1965), this 
literature generally assumes that mass contentious acts occur when institutionalized channels 
for influencing decision making are blocked (McAdam 1982). Electoral fraud constitutes 
prima facie attempt at setting curbs to participation and access to decision making by 
contenders. The electoral “Colour” Revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan 
have stimulated further vigorous theorizing on how fraud might galvanize street action. 
Joshua Tucker has suggested that unlike other sources of grievances, which are often not 
sufficient to surmount collective action problems, electoral fraud can constitute an important 
“focal point” for action. The simultaneity of the abuse suffered by citizens in an electorally 
fraudulent context, it goes, increases the certainty of each protester that others will take to the 
streets, encouraging more and more people to join in (Tucker 2007). Andrew Little et al. have 
developed a formal model demonstrating how signals about high levels of fraud can 
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incentivise citizens to take to the streets and protest (Little, Tucker et al. 2013). Valerie 
Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have likewise argued that rather than dampening participation, as 
Simpser’s model suggests, fraudulent elections may be in fact “unusually good at bringing 
people out into the streets (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, p. 272). “Stolen elections,” they argue 
“focus discontent,” creating new “large and outraged” communities of “’robbed voters’” 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2011, p. 272). Mark Beissinger’s analysis of the Orange Revolution, 
while highlighting a different causal mechanism of a “negative coalition,” likewise 
illuminates how fraud can constitute a “veneer,” however thin, for uniting fractured groups 
with very different values, agendas, and causes, and thereby igniting the flames of discontent 
against a deeply unpopular regime (Beissinger 2013, p. 585). Relatedly, Paul Chaisty and 
Stephen Whitefield find that perceptions of fraud in Russia’s 2011 elections constituted one 
of the most significant triggers of mass support for post-electoral protest (Chaisty and 
Whitefield 2013). A handful of large-n studies have also suggested that electoral malfeasance 
can have powerful mass mobilization effects. For instance, Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov 
find that protests are more likely to occur, and last longer, when credible public allegations of 
fraud are made (Hyde and Marinov 2014). A cross-national study of African states has found 
positive effects of fraud on the likelihood of violent mass contentious acts (Daxecker 2012). 
And Emily Beaulieu, based on cross-national analysis of electoral protests in developing 
countries argues that under certain conditions, electoral malpractice can galvanize politicians 
and activists to encourage electoral protests as a means to enhance their prospects in electoral 
races (Beaulieu 2014). (On the point about electoral protests driven by opposition party-
political actors, see also (Schedler 2013)). “Contentious action,” writes Andreas Schedler 
about electoral protests, “responds to [both] grievances and opportunities” (Schedler 2013, p. 
14).3 
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 How does the incidence of sub-national fraud affect the intensity of post-electoral 
mass protest? The underlying assumption in much of the above rich and innovative recent 
theorizing and empirical scholarship on fraud-inspired mobilizations is that citizens respond 
uniformly to “national” signals about fraud and manipulations that they might pick up from 
national independent media and other channels (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Fearon 2011; 
Tucker 2007). Localised, sub-national protests are therefore unlikely to be affected by the 
specific information about fraud perpetrated in a particular region. Yet, we know from other 
studies that local exit polling and exposure by precinct election monitors of irregularities can 
also help expose locally-perpetrated fraud (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2009). Furthermore, 
Todd Eisenstadt’s (2004, p. 113) work on electoral protests in Mexico suggests that credible 
proof of fraud is not always necessary for sub-national mobilizations; these can flare up 
before irregularities can be conclusively established. Pre-election manipulations occurring in 
specific regions can be another way of signalling local officials’ willingness to commit 
election-day fraud (Hale 2007).  
  In light of the above conflicting logics of arguments about citizens’ potential 
responses to fraud, we advance the following hypotheses: 
 
HY1: Sub-national fraud will have no independent effect on the intensity of mass post-
electoral protest 
 
HY2: Sub-national fraud will positively affect the intensity of mass post-electoral protest 
 
HY3: Sub-national fraud will negatively affect the intensity of mass post-electoral protest 
 
 While testing for HY1-HY3, it is important to control for other factors and variables 
conventionally employed in analyses of regional democratic variations, particularly in 
territorially-large countries like Russia. Scholarship on federalism and decentralization has 
highlighted the spatially uneven nature of democratic governance in many settings (Fox 
1994; Gel'man and Ross 2010; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Gervasoni 2010; Lankina and 
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Getachew 2006, 2012; Lankina, Libman et al. 2016a, 2016b; Lankina and Getachew 2008; 
Putnam 1993; Snyder 2001). Pockets of sub-national authoritarianism may coexist with 
national democratic governance, and sub-national localities may display far greater degrees 
of political openness and competition than does a national regime. These regional variations 
could be products of asymmetrical federal design, long-term socio-structural conditions, 
ethno-national factors, nature of partisan competition, or shorter-term contingent variables 
(Argersinger 1985; Gelman, Ryzhenkov et al. 2003; Hale 2005; Heller 2000; Lankina 2004, 
2016; McMann and Petrov 2000; Obydenkova 2008; Obydenkova and Libman 2012; 
Remington 2010; Sharafutdinova 2007; Snyder 2001; Treisman 1997; Varshney 2002; Ziblatt 
2009). It is important for us to incorporate the effects of these variables into our analysis to 
ensure that our measure of fraud does not proxy for other variables that might shape citizen 
propensity to mobilize. We discuss these relevant variables in the statistical analysis section 
that follows. 
 
Analysis 
Data  
We employ two author-constructed datasets (summary statistics, graphs, and maps of fraud 
and protests are in SI Tables 1-2 and Figures 1-5). The first dataset contains precinct-level 
data for the March 2012 Presidential elections obtained from the Russian Electoral 
Commission website. We have turnout and vote count statistics for each candidate, which, in 
disaggregated form, cover 95,415 polling stations subordinated to the Territorial Electoral 
Commissions. We compiled the second dataset by analysing 4,935 street protest event reports 
(aggregated at the level of regions) posted on the opposition website namarsh.ru. The data 
are based on dispatches from the website’s network of regional correspondents and media 
reports. The website is run by activists sympathetic to the cause of the opposition and 
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therefore interested in ensuring comprehensive harvesting of protest news. Because we 
include web links to the original source for each dataset entry, the accuracy of our data and 
coding could be verified (please see SI for more detail on the data).  
 Our dataset covers protests beginning in March 2007, when the namarsh.ru website 
had been first set up, and ending in April 2013. Our protest intensity indicator is aggregate 
number of protests in a given region and time period; this is a more reliable measure than 
numbers of protesters, which are often under- or over-reported (Robertson 2013). 
Furthermore, Russian national legislation against unsanctioned rallies has often encouraged 
protesters to intentionally limit the number of protest participants, so that the police could not 
legitimately disperse them. Below we discuss the variables employed in our analysis. Tables 
1 and 2 provide the summary statistics and the correlation analysis of the variables used.  
 
Variables and measures 
Pre-election and Post-electoral protest; Political protest. Protests reported in the period 
between 16 March 2007 and 3 March 2012 are classified as Pre-election protests. Post-
electoral protests pertain to the period between 4 March 2012 and 24 April 2013. The 
regression analysis below uses the post-electoral protest counts as dependent variables and 
gets around the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by using the pre-election protest levels 
as control variables to capture the effects of the unobserved region-specific factors common 
to pre-election and post-electoral protest environment. We also categorize protests based on 
the core set of target issues and construct region-specific political protest counts (Political 
protests). By distinguishing political from other types of protests (e.g. social, economic, and 
civic) we seek to capture challenges to the regime related to the electoral process, and, more 
broadly, challenges to the wider political system that facilitates electoral misconduct. We 
acknowledge that many protests that we code as political tend to address a host of issues 
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which may not be exclusively concerned with fraud, but may also address general issues of 
electoral fairness and competition. The namarsh.ru data that we draw on contains only brief 
reports about an event that has taken place and a general summary of the issues addressed in 
the protest. The criteria used for coding political protests were as follows. We categorise as 
political protests those primarily critical of the political regime or containing demands for 
political rights. Usually, such protests are organised by political opposition leaders and 
include large-scale events like March of the Millions, an opposition-staged political march; 
and the Strategiya-31 meetings demanding respect for the right to peaceful assembly. 
Political protests also include rallies against electoral fraud at various levels of authority; 
protests against the abuse of power and against violations of citizens’ democratic rights; 
protests with demands for the resignation of political leaders in power; and protests calling 
for the release of political prisoners. Often, activists from various opposition parties jointly 
stage a rally, advancing numerous political demands. However imperfect, the political 
protests variable is the best data that we have at hand to capture political challenges to the 
regime considering the paucity of sub-national information on street rallies.  
 In contrast to protests that we code as political, generally, protests coded as social, 
economic, and civic are concerned with issues far removed from the electoral and wider 
political processes. Thus, a civic protest might be challenging waste dumping; and a social 
protest might target delays in wage payments by a local enterprise. As a result, if the 
regression analysis shows that general protest counts co-vary with fraud and if the 
relationship is causal, we would expect to observe a similar/stronger link between political 
protest and fraud. To be sure, political protest counts and civic, economic, and social protest 
counts are strongly correlated across the regions (correlation coefficient of 84%). This 
suggests that different protest categories are, in part, driven by common factors, some 
unobserved, that may affect the general participatory environment of a region. The regression 
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analysis below controls for this unobserved heterogeneity. (For further detail on protest 
coding, please see SI). 
 
Last Digit Fraud. Psychological biases and the inability of individuals to generate truly 
random number sequences make last digit tests—tests based on last digit frequencies in vote 
counts reported by electoral commissions—a widely used methodology that helps detect and 
study potential cases of systematic vote count stage fraud (Beber and Scacco 2012; Deckert, 
Myagkov et al. 2011; Lukinova, Myagkov et al. 2011). In free and fair elections, last digits 
𝑗 ∈ {0,1, … ,9} in turnout counts reported by individual precincts with at least 100 registered 
voters can be regarded as outcomes of identical and independent multinomial trials while 
individual digits, and, in particular, last digit zeros, should be observed with uniform 
probability 𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃 = 0.1. Last digit tests that pool data across polling stations in Russia’s 
March 2012 Presidential elections, while ignoring the differences across individual regions, 
strongly reject the hypothesis that the probability of last digit zeros is 10 percent for turnout 
counts, valid vote counts, and votes cast for the March 2012 Presidential elections winner 
Vladimir Putin (Skovoroda and Lankina 2016), while the hypothesis of uniform distribution 
of digits 1 to 9 (excluding last digit zeros) is rejected for turnout counts.  
 
Our measures of region-specific last digit fraud 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9 are based on the 
likelihood ratio statistic and on the concept of deviance and are defined as 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0,𝑖 = 2�𝑂𝐷0𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑂𝐷00.1𝐷𝐷� + (𝐷𝐷 − 𝑂𝐷0)𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝐷𝐷 − 𝑂𝐷00.9𝐷𝐷 �� 
, and  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9,𝑖 = 2�𝑂𝐷1𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑂𝐷1(𝐷𝐷 − 𝑂𝐷0)/9� + ⋯+ 𝑂𝐷9𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑂𝐷9(𝐷𝐷 − 𝑂𝐷0)/9��, 
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where 𝑂𝑖𝑗 is the observed frequency of digit 𝑗 in region 𝐷, and 𝐷𝑖 is the total number of 
polling stations in the region. Relatively larger values of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0,𝑖, for a fixed 𝐷𝑖, indicate 
that the proportion of observed last digit zeros deviates from the 10% benchmark and signal 
deficiencies in electoral integrity in region 𝐷. Relatively larger values of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9,𝑖 , on 
the other hand, indicate that digits 1 to 9 are unlikely to be uniformly distributed.  
 
Oblast and Russians. Russia’s ethnically-defined republics have been consistently generating 
anomalous voting results for ruling political parties in Russia or parties known to be 
supported by the incumbent, at least from the mid-1990s. These patterns cannot be simply 
explained with reference to the electorate’s programmatic preferences—there is no 
consistency in the ideological positions of the succeeding “parties of power.” Indeed, there 
are numerous accounts of both widespread fraud and pre-electoral manipulations in the 
ethnically-defined republics (Hale 2007; Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2005). Because the 
North Caucasus republics in particular are among Russia’s poorest and most dependent on 
federal fiscal transfers, perhaps these patterns can be explained in terms of socio-economic 
vulnerabilities. The wealthier republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are also however 
strongly deferential towards the national ruling parties and incumbents, so the ethnicity 
variable might have something to do with patterns of electoral support. Bryon Moraski and 
William Reisinger (2009) found that a higher share of ethnic Russians in regional populations 
is a consistent predictor of lower levels of regional support for national ruling parties and 
Presidency incumbents. Henry Hale (2007) argues that the pro-Kremlin patterns of 
deferential voting might reflect the survival of soviet-era ethno-patronage networks whereby 
elites in the ethnic autonomies could count on federal affirmative action policies in exchange 
for regime support. To capture these potential influences on the propensity of regions to 
perpetrate fraud, we employ the ethnic Russians as a share of regional populations variable 
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(Russians); and the institutional status variable, which takes the value of one if the region has 
oblast status and zero otherwise (Oblast).  
 
Media freedom. In our analysis, we also control for Media freedom, which captures regional 
media pluralism, censorship, and independence from municipal and regional authorities. This 
measure is obtained from the indices of regional political openness compiled by the scholars 
affiliated4 with the Moscow Carnegie Center Nikolay Petrov and Alexei Titkov (Petrov and 
Titkov 2013). We know that local officials can be highly sensitive to public exposure of their 
involvement in irregularities. (For a discussion, see SI). This would explain why some other 
studies have found media freedom to have a significant moderating effect on fraud (Birch and 
Ham 2014). This variable also captures general levels of regional political openness, so 
including it helps to alleviate concerns that our protest measures are not capturing variations 
in regional democratic conditions. 
 
Fiscal transfers, Income, and Urbanization. We also control for per capita regional GDP 
(Income), urbanization (Urbanization), and federal fiscal transfers as a proportion of regional 
budgets in 2010 (Fiscal transfers). These variables serve as proxies for regional 
developmental variations and for the extent of dependence on the federal centre, factors 
which could in turn affect citizen socio-economic vulnerabilities (and corresponding 
propensity to succumb to pressures to deliver a pro-incumbent vote or to challenge electoral 
misconduct). Some scholars have also argued that fiscal “rentierism”—that is, regional 
dependence on the national centre for politically-motivated fiscal transfers—could be 
propitious for sub-national authoritarianism, which in turn could facilitate electoral 
misconduct (Gervasoni 2010). Fiscal transfers and income data are obtained from the Federal 
State Statistics Service. 
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Methodology 
We use negative binomial regressions to model the expected number of post-electoral 
protests in region i as follows: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑃𝑙𝑃𝑃 − 𝐷𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃)= exp�𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0,𝐷� + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9,𝐷� + 𝛽𝐷𝑙𝐷𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑃� 
  
where control variables include 𝑙𝑙𝑙 (1 + 𝑃𝑒𝐷 − 𝐷𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑙𝐷 𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖). This specification 
allows us to control for the unobserved factors that might affect the general participatory 
environment of a region both before and after the elections. The aim is to test whether post-
electoral protest intensity co-varies with the measures of last-digit fraud. A similar regression 
is fitted for Political protests. Negative binomial specifications account for overdispersion in 
the dependent variables. Control variables also include the (log) of the total number of 
polling stations 𝐷𝑖  in the region. This is due to the fact that deviance measures of fraud 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9 both reflect the amount of region-specific fraud and the 
(region-specific) power of the statistical tests at the same time: if the sample size 𝐷𝑖 and all 
frequencies 𝑂𝑖𝑗 are multiplied by a factor 𝑘, so are 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0,𝑖 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9,𝑖. As a 
result, if sample size 𝐷𝑖 is omitted from the regression specification and if 𝐷𝑖 varies 
systematically with the true measure of last digit fraud, the estimates are likely to be biased. 
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Table 1. Variables, definitions, and descriptive statistics 
 
 Definition N Mean St. dev Min Median Max 
(1) Post-electoral 
Protest 
Total protest counts period 4.03.2012 to 24.04.2013 77 7.53 24.50 0 2 205 
(2) Post-electoral 
Political Protest  Political protest counts period 4.03.2012 to 24.04.2013 77 4.04 13.96 0 1 115 
(3)Pre-election Protest  Total protest counts period 16.03.2007 to 3.03.2012 77 54.79 155.34 0 24 1289 
(4)Pre-election 
Political Protest  Political protest counts period 16.03.2007 to 3.03.2012 77 21.27 64.80 0 10 552 
(5)𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0 Last digit fraud index based on observed frequencies of last 
digit zeros and the likelihood ratio statistics 
77 3.27 13.84 0.00 0.91 121.5 
(6)𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9 Last digit fraud index based on relative frequencies of last 
digits 1 to 9 and the likelihood ratio statistics 
77 8.97 5.34 2.29 7.94 35.67 
(7) Total number of 
polling stations Total number of polling stations in the region 77 1152 788 52 973 3390 
(8) Urbanization Urbanization index, 2010 77 69.6 12.8 27.6 70.2 100 
(9) Income Income per capita (‘000s RUB per month), 2010 77 16.4 6.06 7.54 14.67 43.9 
(10) Fiscal transfers Share of fiscal transfers in regional public expenditures, 
2009, fraction 
77 0.34 0.20 0.04 0.278 1.35 
(11) Media freedom Index of regional media freedom for 2006-2010 77 2.91 0.95 1 3 5 
(12) Russians  Share of ethnic Russians in the regional populations, fraction 77 0.78 0.24 0.01 0.90 0.97 
(13) Oblast Regions with oblast status, dummy 77 0.74 0.44 0 1 1 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix, * p<.05 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Post-electoral 
Protest 1            
(2) Post-electoral 
Political Protest  0.9903* 1           
(3)Pre-election 
Protest  0.9796* 0.9824* 1          
(4)Pre-election 
Political Protest  0.9796* 0.9827* 0.9939* 1         
(5)𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0 -0.0323 -0.0436 -0.0328 -0.0309 1        
(6)𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9 -0.0432 -0.0526 -0.0629 -0.0605 0.5753* 1       
(7) Total number 
of polling 
stations 0.4552* 0.4164* 0.4495* 0.4242* 0.0924 0.0498 1      
(8) Urbanization 0.3794* 0.3792* 0.3954* 0.3695* -0.2412* -0.106 0.2827* 1     
(9) Income 0.5494* 0.5372* 0.5460* 0.5367* -0.0309 -0.127 0.196 0.5513* 1    
(10) Fiscal 
transfers -0.2501* -0.2377* -0.2380* -0.2192 0.2822* 0.0863 -0.4963* -0.6224* -0.2474* 1   
(11) Media 
freedom 0.2445* 0.2536* 0.2889* 0.2608* -0.0284 0.0553 0.3565* 0.3779* 0.1097 -0.3438* 1  
(12) Russians  0.1094 0.1031 0.1298 0.1137 -0.4250* -0.2198 0.175 0.5725* 0.1405 -0.5985* 0.3507* 1 
(13) Oblast 0.1407 0.134 0.1537 0.1336 -0.2385* -0.1761 0.2523* 0.5312* 0.1408 -0.4863* 0.3515* 0.8490* 
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Hypotheses testing 
Table 3 reports the results of a set of negative binomial regressions. In specification M1, 
post-electoral Protest is regressed on the baseline (pre-election) protest intensity, on the last 
digit fraud measures Deviance0 and Deviance1-9, and on control variables log(Total number of 
polling stations), Urbanization, Fiscal Transfers, Russians and Media Freedom. Not 
unexpectedly, the pre-election protest intensity is identified as highly significant. Controlling 
for the baseline protest intensity, Deviance0 is found to be positively and significantly 
correlated with post-electoral political protests. This indicates that regions where the 
deviations in the proportion of observed last digit zeros from the 10% benchmark are 
statistically more significant are characterized by relatively higher levels of post-electoral 
protest intensity. As far as the control variables are concened, regions relatively more 
dependent on federal transfers (Fiscal transfers) are characterised by a somewhat steeper 
decline in post-electoral Protest, even though this effect is not statistically significant. Model 
2 introduces an alternative set of control variables that includes Oblast and Income, while 
Russians, Fiscal Transfers, and Urbanization are excluded due to multicollinearity. The key 
last digit fraud measure Deviance0 is identified as positive and statistically significant in this 
new specification. These results lend support for HY2 and suggest that regional last digit 
fraud positively affects the intensity of mass post-electoral protests. The media freedom 
variable is not significant, which may indicate that other channels are likely to be more 
effective in exposing fraud and galvanizing post-electoral protest. Pre-electoral protest 
activism (statistically significant and positive in Models 1-2), which could encourage citizens 
to show vigilance in exposing fraud during the elections, may be one such alternative 
channel. Another potential channel of information dissemination about fraud (not captured by 
our media freedom measure) would be online social media networks (Greene 2013; Smyth 
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and Oates 2015). The interaction effects between fraud and media freedom have also been 
tested and are not statistically significant. 
 If hypothesis HY2 is correct, we would also expect to see the evidence of the fraud-
to-protest link in Political protest regressions, as the Political protest category should be 
particularly sensitive to the issues of the electoral process. Models 3 and 4 (Table 3), 
investigate this proposition. Similar to the first two regressions and consistent with HY2, 
Political protest regressions identify last digit fraud measure Deviance0 as statistically 
significant, suggesting that regional last digit fraud positively affects the intensity of mass 
post-electoral political protests.  
 
Robustness checks 
In order to be reassured about the robustness of our results, we perform two sets of additional 
checks. In the first set of robustness checks, we employ alternative control variables that are 
related to regional democratic variations. The index of regional democracy that we employ in 
our robustness checks has been developed in the 1990s-2000s by two experts affiliated with 
the Moscow Carnegie Centre, Nikolay Petrov and Alexei Titkov (both presently employed at 
the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Further details on the indices are contained in 
SI).  The index is constructed relying on subjective expert assessments, as well as systematic 
electoral competition data that are referred to as “instrumental” measures (such as effective 
number of candidates in governor elections; winning candidate’s share of vote in governor 
elections; governor turnover rates; and recorded instances of electoral malpractice). These 
latter types of “instrumental” measures are frequently employed in studies of cross-national 
democracy (Lankina & Getachew, 2012; Vanhanen, 2000).  As Lankina et al. (2016b) write, 
there is a high degree of correspondence between Petrov and Titkov’s evaluations of Russian 
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regional democracy and assessments by scholars relying on alternative measures of regional 
democratic variations. This provides additional confidence in the validity of the Petrov and 
Titkov democracy measures employed in our study’s robustness checks. 
 The indicators that we employ, constructed based on an assessment of regional 
democratic characteristics for the years 2006-2010, are Media Freedom, Economic 
Liberalism, Civil Society, Political Structure, Elites, Corruption, Local Self-Governance, 
Openness, Democratic Elections, and Political Pluralism. These  indicators are highly 
correlated. We therefore run multiple alternative specifications where we control for each of 
these indicators separately in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. We also tested the 
aggregate “democracy index” that represents a simple average of the individual indicators 
listed above. We find that the central result of the positive relationship between last-digit 
fraud and post-electoral change in protest intensity is robust and is confirmed in all the 
specifications. (The selected results with alternative sets of control variables are presented in 
SI, Tables 4a and 4b). 
 Second, we test whether the results discussed in the previous section (where post-
electoral protest intensity is measured over a thirteen-month period between 4 March 2012 
and 24 April 2013) hold when post-electoral protest intensity is measured over a shorter, 
three-month, period between 4 March 2012 and 4 June 2012. A causal interpretation of our 
results hinges on the assumption that the strength of election-day fraud is indeed the 
immediate cause of the post-electoral change in protest intensity. However, it is increasingly 
unlikely that protests that happened six, nine, and twelve months after the election have 
election fraud as their immediate source of grievance and are not caused, instead, by issues 
related to post-electoral regional developments that might be correlated (not necessarily via a 
causal link) with the strength of  election-day fraud. Post-electoral protests reported 
immediately after elections are perhaps more likely to be directly related to electoral process 
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issues. The tests that we report in SI, Table 5, confirm that the last-digit fraud measure 
Deviance0 is statistically significant both in the 3-month Post-electoral Protest regressions 
and in the 3-month Post-electoral Political protest regressions, supporting HY2. We further 
show that the positive correlation between fraud and post-electoral change in protests is 
robust to the inclusion of a control variable that measures the geographical Distance from 
Moscow (in ‘000s km), both in the thirteen-month and in the three-month specifications. 
Overall, we are satisfied that the results are robust to alternative specifications. 
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Table 3. Determinants of post-electoral regional protest intensity, negative binomial 
regressions  
 
M1 
Post-electoral 
 Protest 
 
M2 
Post-electoral 
Protest 
 
M3 
Post-electoral 
Political 
Protest 
M4 
Post-electoral 
Political 
Protest 
𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index 
based on observed 
frequencies of Last Digit 
Zeros) 
0.0994* 
(0.0446)    
0.109**     
(0.0373)     
0.138+ 
(0.0776) 
0.149* 
(0.0696) 
𝐿𝑙𝑙 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index 
based on relative frequencies 
of last digits 1 to 9) 
 -0.0477 
(0.167)     
-0.0216 
(0.189)         
-0.0455  
(0.219)     
0.00695 
(0.247)   
Log total number of 
polling stations in the 
region 
0.124 
(0.208)          
0.316 
(0.192)         
-0.188 
(0.315)      
0.155 
(0.230)   
Urbanization 0.00808  (0.0128)   
-0.00383 
(0.0138)  
Fiscal transfers -1.521 (0.975)  
-2.494+ 
(1.362)  
Russians -0.513            (0.666)              
-0.573         
(0.823)           
Media freedom -0.184 (0.118)      
-0.167 
(0.117)         
-0.0651 
(0.151)     
-0.0936 
(0.171)   
Oblast  0.265 (0.295)  
0.437 
(0.464) 
Income  0.00783             (0.0149)             
-0.00972 
(0.0172)  
Log (1+ Pre-election 
protest) 
1.062** 
(0.117) 
1.041** 
(0.114)   
Log, (1+ Pre-election 
political protest)    
1.272** 
(0.157) 
1.256** 
(0.124) 
Constant -2.301 (2.023)          
-4.302** 
(1.050)         
0.405 
(3.044)      
-3.772** 
(1.446)  
Pseudo R2 0.2892 0.2791 0.2856 0.2762 
Obs. 77 77 77 77 
Wald chi2 Chi2(8) = 305.53 
Chi2(7) = 
401.17 
Chi2(8) = 
170.69 
Chi2(7) = 
288.82 
LR test for overdispersion 33.66** 42.01** 10.47** 15.06** 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.005 
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Conclusion 
Our study indicates that Russian citizens were sensitive to signals about fraud perpetrated in 
their regions and challenged it by participating in post-electoral street rallies. As such, it 
corroborates insights from cross-national analyses suggesting that “the general public—
individually and collectively—is capable of making fairly accurate assessments about the 
quality of elections occurring in their own country” (Norris 2014, p. 91). As Pippa Norris 
found, popular perceptions of the likelihood that fraud and other types of malpractice have 
occurred can be remarkably congruent with those of independent international experts 
specifically tasked with monitoring and assessing the quality of elections (Norris 2014, p. 
99). The analysis presented in this paper makes several, more specific, contributions to the 
literature on electoral protest. First, our methodological strategy highlights the importance of 
incorporating sub-national street rallies into analyses of post-electoral mobilization. We 
accept that large-scale protests occurring in national capitals—which have been the focus of 
much of the literature on electoral protest—can have significant implications for regime 
stability in competitive authoritarian states. Yet, a preoccupation with protesters congregating 
in large cities might obscure the significance of provincial rallies, which, as our study has 
demonstrated, may have important signalling effects in terms of generating awareness among 
the citizenry about fraud. Second, as noted earlier, there is some ambiguity in the literature as 
to whether fraud has a galvanizing effect on protest, or, alternatively, whether it can in fact 
dampen enthusiasm for street mobilization to challenge the regime. Many more studies have 
tended to regard fraud as a galvanizing force for protest than those which have argued that the 
opposite tendency is usually at work. Yet, the former have drawn their empirical insights 
from a handful of high-profile successful electoral revolutions. Our sub-national approach 
allows us to further interrogate—and find support for—those assumptions that highlight the 
protest-generating potential of fraud. Unlike the earlier research however, we do not select 
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our cases based on a successful electoral protest outcome; rather, we employ a large number 
of observations corresponding to virtually all of Russia’s regions, among which we find 
significant variations both in terms of their propensity to commit fraud and in terms of the 
intensity of street protest. 
 We accept that there may be a tendency of sub-national clients of the national regime 
to resort to multiple strategies of malpractice to ensure the desired result in the elections. In 
fact, in another paper we demonstrate that regional officials are likely to have used a variety 
of complementary types of electoral misconduct in the 2012 elections (Skovoroda and 
Lankina 2016). For instance, the strategy of tampering with ballots and vote counts is likely 
to have been augmented with both the pre-electoral manipulations, such as pressurising 
citizens to vote for the “right” candidate; and other election-day types of misconduct, such as, 
for instance, obstructing the work of electoral monitors at a given polling station. Our results 
may thus pick up the sensitivity of citizens to these different, more easily observable, 
manipulative and fraudulent tactics, and not just the sensitivity to the type of fraud used as a 
measure in our study.5 Yet, insofar as regional officials tend to resort to the fraudulent and 
manipulative strategies in a complementary fashion, the last-digit fraud measure that we 
employ may be regarded as a reasonably accurate measure of the general propensity of 
regions to commit violations of electoral integrity. Furthermore, unlike with many other types 
of misconduct, the value of the last-digit type of fraud measure that we employ is that it can 
be systematically captured in statistical analysis. 
 Finally, our findings indicate that sub-national post-electoral protest could be 
regarded as an additional mechanism for uncovering spatial variations in fraud, 
complementary to the “forensic” techniques discussed in this paper. Protests could also 
complement the formal mechanisms of electoral scrutiny such as election monitoring and 
observation, which, as a number of recent studies have noted, can be effective both at 
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exposing fraud and preventing it (Birch and Ham 2014; Hyde and Marinov 2014; Hyde 2007) 
(but see (Simpser and Donno 2012)). Although beyond the scope of this study, relatedly, we 
may also conjecture that protest may serve as an additional signalling mechanism in cases 
where rulers seek to “displace” (Ichino and Schuendeln 2012) fraud from one locality to 
another as a way of avoiding electoral scrutiny by monitors who are often spread thinly 
across the territory of a particular country and do not usually cover each and every electoral 
precinct.  
 We accept that there are a number of scope restrictions qualifying the conditions 
under which our findings apply. As noted earlier, some scholars see fraud as the motor of 
street contention (Tucker 2007). This line of theorizing however would stop short of 
explaining why fraud often goes unchallenged (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; 
Simpser 2013; Tucker 2007). Our objective has been to analyse the implications of locally-
perpetrated fraud for sub-national protest during a period of heightened mobilization against 
an autocratic regime. Such episodes of contention occur where factors conducive to the 
genesis of protests are already at work, most notably a constellation of propitious national 
political opportunities (Greene 2013; Tarrow 1996). Street action might also represent a 
culmination of a long-term process of accumulation of skills, experiences, and cultural capital 
essential for generating anti-systemic challenge (Robertson 2007; 2013). Furthermore, fraud 
might go unchallenged during several electoral periods, yet, over the long-term it may erode 
system legitimacy, galvanizing protests.  
 Further analysis is also warranted of the mechanisms of signalling fraud, which might 
mediate the causal links between fraud and protest uncovered in our research. Does mass 
protest indicate political opposition strength in a given region and its capacity to furnish 
electoral monitors, who then expose fraud? We know that political competition may promote 
the exposure of dirty tricks by rival candidates, for instance (Sharafutdinova 2011). Is it the 
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case that regions with more protest also those where the media environment is relatively open 
enabling the dissemination of credible signals about fraud? While our analysis and robustness 
checks do not indicate that independent regional media significantly affect the propensity to 
protest, we are aware that online social media, which we do not incorporate into the statistical 
analysis part of our study, had been particularly instrumental in exposing fraud in Russia’s 
2011-2012 elections. Although we provide some illustrative examples of the information 
dissemination role of the social media in exposing fraud in Russia (see SI), more systematic 
analysis is required to ascertain how these signalling effects worked to rally citizens in the 
various regions.  
 Finally, as a post-script to our study, we would like to acknowledge the uncertain 
implications of dramatic citizen mobilization for a country’s democratic prospects (Bermeo 
1997; Goldstone 2001). Nevertheless, our research underlines the potentially corrosive effects 
of local contention on the spatial component of hybrid regimes’ efforts at self-reproduction. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 The approach also has limitations. The tests are robust to various data generating processes, 
but target a particular type of fraud mostly consisting of writing in made-up numbers in the 
polling stations’ return sheets. These tests may not detect forced voting, multiple voting, and 
ballot stuffing. 
2 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for encouraging us to justify and sharpen our use 
of the various terms. Smyth et al. (2013, p. 25), in what is different from our approach, 
characterise Russia’s regime at the time of the 2012 elections as electoral authoritarian in that 
electoral competition is combined with “elements of coercion and manipulation.”  
3 Oxford Scholarship Online pagination 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680320.001.0001/acpro
f-9780199680320-chapter-10?print=pdf 
4 Currently, they are affiliated with the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, but the 
ratings have been developed as part of the Moscow Carnegie Centre’s project to monitor 
democratic variations in Russia’s regions. 
5 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for suggesting this point. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1. The 2012 Presidential elections summary statistics 
 Aggregate Polling stations 
 Official 
count 
10th 
percentile 
Median 90th 
percentile 
Polling station size  
(number of registered 
voters) 
 159 1001 2409 
Turnout (%) 65.26 53.49 66.04 94.01 
Vote counts (%)     
Vladimir Putin 63.60 50.52 64.40 86.15 
Gennadiy Zyuganov 17.18 5.79 16.85 25.78 
Mikhail Prokhorov  7.98 0.71 4.97 13.45 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky  6.22 1.47 6.40 10.45 
Sergey Mironov  3.85 0.62 3.42 6.14 
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Figure 1. Over time trends in counts of various types of protests. The 2007 data are for 
March-December, and the 2013 data are for January-April. 
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Figures 2-4. Spatial patterns of fraud and protest. Note: On the fraud map, denser shades 
indicate lower probability of fraud; on the protest maps denser shades indicate higher protest 
counts.  Period 1 protests refers to the period 16.03.2007 to 3.03.2012.  Period 2 protests refer 
to the period 4.03.2012 to 24.04.2013. 
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Table 2. Turnout in the 2012 Presidential elections by region, %  
(regions arranged by highest turnout) 
 
Turnout 2012 
Chechnya 99.61 
Yamalo-Nenetsk AO 93.35 
Tyva 92.62 
Karachay-Cherkessiya 91.28 
Dagestan 91.10 
Mordoviya 89.58 
Ingushetiya 86.47 
Tatarstan 83.00 
Chukotka AO 81.56 
North Ossetia 80.71 
Tyumen 79.15 
Kemerovo 79.10 
Bashkortostan 76.32 
Sakha 74.50 
Belgorod 74.34 
Chuvash 73.64 
Kabardino-Balkariya 73.05 
Mari El 70.85 
Krasnodar 70.78 
Tambov 70.08 
Komi 70.04 
Tula 69.45 
Penza 68.12 
Orel 68.04 
Voronezh 67.99 
Altai Republic 67.25 
Bryansk 66.97 
Nizhhegorodskaya 66.89 
Saratov 66.44 
Buryatia 66.15 
Lipetsk 65.63 
Khakassia 64.69 
Udmurtiya 64.39 
Adygeya 64.33 
Kurgan 64.16 
Ryazan 64.15 
Primorsky 64.14 
Khanty Mansi 64.06 
Kursk 64.02 
Volgograd 63.81 
Rostov 63.73 
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Ulyanovsk 63.52 
Kaluga 63.51 
Yaroslavsk 63.48 
Leningrad 63.24 
Novosibirsk 63.23 
Chelyabinsk 62.71 
Nenetsk AO 62.49 
St. Petersburg 62.05 
Kalmykiya 62.01 
Khabarovsk 61.92 
Omsk 61.65 
Vologda 61.63 
Kostroma 61.43 
Moscow Oblast 61.34 
Kirov 61.31 
Orenburg 61.19 
Pskov 61.19 
Kamchatka 61.07 
Samara 60.78 
Murmansk 60.43 
Amur 60.35 
Stavropol 60.27 
Altai Krai 59.93 
Zabaikalsky 59.93 
Ivanovo 59.93 
Krasnoyarsk 59.47 
Kaliningrad 59.29 
Smolensk 59.04 
Magadan 58.96 
Sverdlovsk 58.79 
Tver 58.70 
Novgorod 58.64 
Jewish AO 58.52 
Tomsk 58.23 
Arkhangelsk 58.16 
MoscowCity 58.11 
Sakhalin 57.25 
Astrakhan 56.21 
Irkutsk 56.01 
Karelia 55.38 
Perm 55.09 
Vladimir 53.07 
Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. 
http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=1001000
31793509&vrn=100100031793505&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd
=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227 
  
9 
 
Table 3. Vote share for the winning candidate in the 2012 Presidential elections by 
region, % (regions arranged by highest vote share)  
 
Vote share 2012 
Chechnya 99.76 
Dagestan 92.84 
Ingushetia 91.91 
Karachay-Cherkessiya 91.36 
Tyva 90 
Mordovia 87.06 
Yamalo-Nenetsk AO 84.58 
Tatarstan 82.7 
Kabardino-Balkariya 77.64 
Kemerovo 77.19 
Bashkortostan 75.28 
Tyumen 73.1 
Chukotka AO 72.64 
Tambov 71.76 
Saratov 70.64 
Kalmykiya 70.3 
North Ossetia 70.06 
Sakha 69.46 
Astrakhan 68.76 
Tula 67.77 
Altai Republic 66.87 
Khanty Mansi 66.41 
Buryatiya 66.2 
Udmurtiya 65.75 
Zabaikalsky 65.69 
Chelyabinsk 65.02 
Komi 65.02 
Sverdlovsk 64.5 
Stavropol 64.47 
Penza 64.27 
Adygeya 64.07 
Bryansk 64.02 
Nizhhegorodskaya 63.9 
Krasnodar 63.72 
Volgograd 63.41 
Kurgan 63.39 
Perm 62.94 
Amur 62.84 
Rostov 62.66 
Chuvash 62.32 
Leningrad 61.9 
Ivanovo 61.85 
Jewish AO 61.59 
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Voronezh 61.34 
Lipetsk 60.99 
Kursk 60.45 
Krasnoyarsk 60.16 
Murmansk 60.05 
Mari El 59.98 
Kamchatka 59.84 
Ryazan 59.74 
Pskov 59.69 
Vologda 59.44 
Belgorod 59.3 
Kaluga 59.02 
St. Petersburg 58.77 
Samara 58.56 
Khakassiya 58.4 
Ulyanovsk 58.18 
Tver 58.02 
Arkhangelsk 57.97 
Kirov 57.93 
Novgorod 57.91 
Altai Krai 57.35 
Primorsky 57.31 
Tomsk 57.07 
Nenets AO 57.05 
Orenburg 56.89 
Moscow Oblast 56.85 
Smolensk 56.69 
Novosibirsk 56.34 
Sakhalin 56.3 
Magadan 56.25 
Khabarovsk 56.15 
Omsk 55.55 
Irkutsk 55.45 
Kareliya 55.38 
Yaroslavsk 54.53 
Vladimir 53.49 
Orel 52.84 
Kostroma 52.78 
Kaliningrad 52.55 
Moscow City 46.95 
Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. 
http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=1001000
31793509&vrn=100100031793505&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd
=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227
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Table 4a. Determinants of post-electoral political protest intensity, alternative control variables, negative binomial regressions  
 Dependent variable: Post-electoral Political Protest 
Political control variable =  Civil Society Political Structure 
Self-
governance Openness 
Democratic 
Elections 
Political 
Pluralism 
𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index based on 
observed frequencies of Last Digit Zeros) 
0.155* 
(0.0693) 
0.144* 
(0.0706) 
0.165* 
(0.0711) 
0.135* 
(0.0671) 
0.152* 
(0.0691) 
0.167* 
(0.0646) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index based on 
relative frequencies of last digits 1 to 9) 
0.0826  
(0.251)     
0.0418  
(0.249)     
0.125  
(0.244)     
0.0388  
(0.249)  
0.0511  
(0.250)     
0.0205  
(0.258)     
Log total number of polling stations in 
the region 
0.157 
(0.238)      
0.0930 
(0.221)      
0.124 
(0.237)      
0.0785 
(0.245)      
0.153 
(0.233)      
0.166 
(0.250)      
Political control variable -0.0853 (0.0177) 
0.185 
(0.187) 
-0.217 
(0.185) 
0.167 
(0.159) 
-0.185 
(0.167) 
-0.360 
(0.224) 
Oblast 0.407 (0.402) 
0.241 
(0.436) 
0.600 
(0.516) 
0.246 
(0.409) 
0.571 
(0.442) 
0.632+ 
(0.327) 
Income -0.00811 (0.0178)   
-0.0138 
(0.0149)  
-0.0190 
(0.0218)  
-0.0188 
(0.0170)          
-0.0126 
(0.0188)          
-0.0138 
(0.0155)          
Log, (1+ Pre-election political protest)  1.238** (0.107) 
1.252** 
(0.113) 
1.233** 
(0.114) 
1.242** 
(0.119) 
1.207** 
(0.109) 
1.240** 
(0.107) 
Constant -3.766* (1.379)      
-3.943** 
(1.380)      
-3.218* 
(1.459)      
-3.735* 
(1.353)      
-3.385* 
(1.439)      
-3.351 
(1.431)      
Pseudo R2 0.2758 0.2771 0.2788 0.2774 0.2795 0.2851 
Obs. 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Wald chi2 Chi2(7) = 299.81 
Chi2(7) = 
351.39 
Chi2(7) = 
213.79 
Chi2(7) = 
277.69 
Chi2(7) = 
282.54 
Chi2(7) = 
380.80 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.005  
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Table 4b. Determinants of post-electoral political protest intensity, alternative control variables, negative binomial regressions  
 Dependent variable: Post-electoral Political Protest 
Political control variable =  Civil Society Political Structure 
Self-
governance Openness 
Democratic 
Elections 
Political 
Pluralism 
𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index based on 
observed frequencies of Last Digit Zeros) 
0.150+ 
(0.0794) 
0.126+ 
(0.0755) 
0.142+ 
(0.0772) 
0.121 
(0.0755) 
0.147+ 
(0.0765) 
0.156* 
(0.0736) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9)  
(Last Digit Fraud Index based on 
relative frequencies of last digits 1 to 9) 
-0.0253  
(0.208)     
-0.0742  
(0.218)     
-0.0321  
(0.2226)     
-0.0851  
(0.219)     
-0.0623  
(0.223)     
0.0518  
(0.230)     
Log total number of polling stations in 
the region 
-0.188 
(0.327)      
-0.255 
(0.310)      
-0.205 
(0.324)      
-0.280 
(0.336)      
-0.210 
(0.323)      
-0.173 
(0.346)      
Urbanization -0.00430 (0.0139) 
-0.0116 
(0.0142) 
-0.00531 
(0.0143) 
-0.0105 
(0.0149) 
-0.00358 
(0.0137) 
-0.00254 
(0.0141) 
Fiscal transfers -2.596+ (1.391) 
-2.560+ 
(1.332) 
-2.497+ 
(1.369) 
-2.617* 
(1.362) 
-2.539+ 
(1.361) 
-2.321 
(1.447) 
Russians -0.546 (0.827)   
-0.849 
(0.805)  
-0.527 
(0.871)          
-0.794 
(0.806)          
-0.349 
(0.788)          
-0.287 
(0.845)          
Political control variable -0.109 (0.171)     
0.236 
(0.199)     
-0.0665 
(0.191)     
0.176 
(0.156)     
-0.143 
(0.149)     
-0.246 
(0.249)     
Log, (1+ Pre-election political protest)  1.269** (0.146) 
1.297** 
(0.149) 
1.256** 
(0.153) 
1.267** 
(0.160) 
1.229** 
(0.147) 
1.238** 
(0.151) 
Constant 0.588 (3.125)      
0.680 
(3.088)      
0.614 
(3.139)      
0.989 
(3.161)      
0.765 
(3.164)      
0.392 
(3.335)      
Pseudo R2 0.2864 0.2882 0.2855 0.2881 0.2877 0.2902 
Obs. 77 77 77 77 77 77 
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Wald chi2 Chi2(8) = 182.19 
Chi2(8) = 
232.33 
Chi2(8) = 
154.31 
Chi2(8) = 
149.23 
Chi2(8) = 
150.09 
Chi2(8) = 
188.55 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.005 
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Table 5. 12-month and 3-month post-electoral regional protest intensity, negative 
binomial regressions  
Dependent variable: 
M1 
13-Month 
post-electoral 
 protest, period 
4.03.2012 to 
24.04.2013 
 
M2 
3-Month post-
electoral 
protest,  
period 
4.03.2012 to 
4.06.2012 
 
M3 
13-Month 
post-electoral 
political 
protest,  
period 
4.03.2012 to 
24.04.2013 
M4 
3-Month post-
electoral 
political 
protest,  
period 
4.03.2012 to 
4.06.2012 
𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)  
(Last digit fraud index based 
on observed frequencies of 
last digit zeros 
0.126** 
(0.0413) 
0.180* 
(0.0739) 
0.168* 
(0.0702) 
0.255* 
(0.101) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1−9)  
(Last digit fraud index based 
on relative frequencies of 
last digits 1 to 9) 
-0.0717 
(0.162) 
-0.138 
(0.239) 
-0.0714 
(0.222) 
-0.200 
(0.278) 
Log total number of polling 
stations in the region 
0.0795 
(0.205) 
0.0450 
(0.365) 
-0.163 
(0.310) 
-0.219 
(0.378) 
Distance from Moscow -0.124+ (0.0712) 
-0.123 
(0.0963) 
-0.139+ 
(0.0768) 
-0.0860 
(0.109) 
Fiscal transfers -1.340* (0.479) 
-2.226* 
(0.848) 
-1.818 
(1.138) 
-3.028* 
(1.296) 
Media freedom -0.134 (0.114) 
-0.312* 
(0.132) 
-0.0592 
(0.147) 
-0.246 
(0.179) 
Log (1+ Pre-election 
protest) 
1.043** 
(0.0987) 
0.987** 
(0.156)   
Log, (1+ Pre-election 
political protest)    
1.184** 
(0.143) 
1.130** 
(0.160) 
Constant -1.717 (1.295) 
-1.312 
(2.297) 
-0.218 
(2.591) 
0.754 
(2.908) 
Pseudo R2 0.2933 0.2820 0.2899 0.2798 
Obs. 77 77 77 77 
Wald chi2 Chi2(7) = 333.05 
Chi2(7) = 
283.21 
Chi2(7) = 
200.40 
Chi2(7) = 
195.48 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.005 
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Protest Data 
 
We here provide more detail on the protest dataset that we assembled, acknowledging both 
the merits and limitations of our data and coding. The dataset that we assembled from the 
namarsh.ru website encompasses both small-scale acts and large-scale demonstrations 
involving tens of thousands of people with diverse political preferences. It includes localised 
political protests, such as demands to remove corrupt mayors and those targeting national 
authorities. It also covers a wide range of protest issues. Aside from political protests, the 
data include street protests motivated by socio-economic grievances like frustration over 
wage arrears; and cultural issues, for instance when activists protest against the destruction of 
monuments or the closure of a local museum. Events organized by the governing United 
Russia (UR) party or pro-government youth movements are excluded from the analysis.   
 When analyzing Russian protest data obtained from another opposition website run by 
the Institute of Collective Action (IKD), Robertson (2013) points out that some degree of 
ambiguity of intentions is likely to characterize the compilations of the various political 
websites.  For instance, there might be a tendency to over-report political protests or under-
report those representing protesters in a negative light. Furthermore, Robinson and Reuter 
compiled Russian regional protest data based on protest reporting by the Russian Communist 
Party (KPRF), and found that it only partially correlates with reporting by the more liberal 
political sources (Robertson and Reuter 2013).  
 We acknowledge that our reliance on namarsh.ru might present similar issues of 
over- and under-reporting. Nevertheless, the data provide a reasonably accurate portrait of 
general protest trends.  They dovetail with public opinion polls about the intentionality of 
participation and citizen activism across the various time periods and regions (Petrov 2005).   
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Cross-validation with Robertson’s protest dataset. Robertson’s data, which are based on the 
IKD source for 2007-2012, cover the period January 2007 to March 2012 and comprise 5540 
protest events across 74 regions. Regional (Log) protest counts across the two datasets over 
the five year period March-2007 to March-2012 are highly correlated with a correlation 
coefficient of 77%. Our full dataset covers the period 16 March 2007 to 24 April 2013.  
 
Criteria for coding political protests. We coded as “political” the following types of protest. 
(Although protests contain multiple demands, we highlight what types of demands tend to be 
advanced in protests that we code as political, and list them as separate bullet points, for 
analytical clarity). 
• Generally, these are anti-government protests with broad agendas. (These protests 
may include other issues, but criticism of regime/ government policy/ politics or 
demands for the protection of political rights form the crux of the event). These events 
are often organised by the political opposition, though they are not exclusive to one 
particular party or civic movement. These include events like the March of the 
Millions, a mass civic march organised by the political opposition, and Strategiya-
31civic meetings organised in support of the right to peaceful assembly. We also 
coded as political anti-government protests organized by nationalist activists 
(excluding those sponsored by the government). 
• Protests more narrowly concerned with electoral fraud, rather than, say, merely 
featuring calls for resignation of national leaders are also coded as political. The 
largest wave of these protests occurred between December 2011 and May 2012.  They 
were spurred by electoral violations that occurred during the legislative and 
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presidential elections. Protests against local and regional instances of electoral fraud 
are also included. 
• Protests calling for resignation of elected or appointed officials at all levels of 
government are also coded as political.  
• Protests against political repression and associated actions are also coded as political. 
These protests include protests for the release of those apprehended for political 
reasons (including protesters who were apprehended for taking part in street rallies), 
protests organized by the group Memorial commemorating deaths related to political 
repression, protests in support of political activists, protests against police abuse and 
repression of political activists. 
• Protests against specific aspects of Russian foreign policy, such as those against 
Russia’s cooperation with Japan over the Kuril Islands, or protests in support of 
political events abroad, such as those expressing solidarity with anti-regime protesters 
elsewhere, are likewise coded as political. 
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Regional Signals About Fraud 
What are the precise causal mechanisms accounting for citizen awareness of electoral 
irregularities perpetrated in their region?  The 2011 and 2012 elections generated 
unprecedented citizen mobilization to expose irregularities perpetrated in favour of the Putin-
Medvedev regime.  Social media played a particularly strong role in generating and spreading 
information about misconduct.  In this section, for illustrative purposes, we provide some 
examples of how citizens picked up information about fraud in specific precincts and how 
they then generated awareness about fraud by disseminating this information widely. 
Specifically, we draw on You-tube videos exposing fraud and other types of misconduct 
perpetrated during both the 2011 and 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential elections and that 
were widely circulating in Russia’s blogosphere and are still available for downloading. The 
videos were taken by those who volunteered to be election monitors, ordinary citizens, and 
opposition party political activists.  The videos put the spotlight on precinct officials, 
catching them in the act of committing fraud.   
 One video is taken by an activist, who had positioned himself on a higher level gallery 
overlooking the room where voting takes place. The video zooms in on an unsuspecting 
precinct official entering information into bulletins.  The volunteer first calls the official by 
name: “Greetings, Nikolay Alekseevich!” He then loudly addresses the other people in the 
room asking if the election monitors are present, and if so, whether they would come forward.  
He then announces to the people in the room that the chairman of the election commission is 
perpetrating an act that has criminal consequences, namely that he is tampering with the 
ballots.  The official is visibly nervous, and one can see on the camera how he tries to shift 
around the papers on his desk.  The witness presses on: “You have all just been witnesses to a 
criminal act perpetrated by the chairman of the commission.” The official asks the individual 
taking the video to leave.i  
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 On another video, taken during the December 2011 elections, a female journalist, 
filming a female precinct electoral official, demands to be present at the counting of ballots 
after polling had ended.  The official referred to as the “chairperson of the electoral 
commission” demands that the journalist leave the premises.  The journalist introduces 
herself and asks the official to introduce herself in turn. This she repeatedly refuses to do.  
Eventually, the election official, who appears very agitated, threatens that she will call the 
police.  The police officer appears and the recording stops. In the background to this scene, 
one sees a door that has the first three letters of the Russian alphabet and above them a sign 
“3 B.”  This indicates that the polling station is likely to be a school.  This incident was 
subsequently reported in online media, revealing that it occurred at School No. 320 of the 
Primorsky district of the city of St. Petersburg, which housed two polling stations.  The 
written commentary to the video also indicates that contrary to the assertions of the election 
official, journalists have a legal right to be present when the ballots are counted.ii   
 A video taken in another precinct shows three female electoral candidates from 
opposition parties Just Russia and Yabloko speaking to the camera about being barred from 
exercising their legal right to inspect the electoral documents, which, their statements imply, 
had been tampered with.  In particular, they note the discrepancies between the number of 
people who voted and the records of a much larger number of votes ostensibly cast, in the 
electoral documents.  They also note that election monitors had been earlier removed from 
the station.  The women display official proof of their candidate status and studiously recite 
specific items in the Russian federal legislation about their rights and legal responsibility of 
the respective electoral officials to facilitate their right to observe the elections.  The camera 
shows visibly nervous officials sitting at their desk trying to cover the papers that they had 
been writing in, with their hands.  The police appear, a scuffle ensues, and the women are 
removed from the polling station.iii   
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 Other strategies were also employed to increase citizen awareness of regional fraud.  
Street rallies that took place around the time of the elections had loudspeakers set up, and 
ordinary people could use them to name and shame individuals engaging in electoral 
manipulations.  For instance, students reported intimidation and threats of dismissals by 
university deans should they turn up at protest demonstrations, not turn up to vote, or do not 
vote for the “right candidate.”iv  The names of precinct pre-election manipulators and 
election-day falsifikatory (falsifiers) in some regions featured in print and online media, with 
bloggers actively soliciting names, affiliations, and official positions, of other fraudsters that 
they could post online.v  Furthermore, loud broadcasting of information about concrete 
officials or institutions engaging in manipulations and fraud to large public audiences in 
central squares of provincial cities—sometimes broadcast via web-cameras attached to 
computers present at ralliesvi—is bound to have increased citizen awareness of manipulations 
and fraud occurring in specific regions.  
 It is also important to note that around the time of the 2011-2012 elections, electoral 
fraud became a matter of concern to a broad spectrum of the citizenry to a far greater extent 
than in previous elections, transcending the narrower group of party-political actors with a 
direct stake in the electoral process as potential future power holders.  An analysis of protest 
event descriptions indicates that while political parties featured strongly as organisers of 
protests in some regions, in others, key organizers were local civic groups or alliances of 
various civic and political groupings.vii  The cross-party and cross-actor solidarities which 
protests may have reinforced are illustrated in one of the You-tube videos of fraud discussed 
above, the particular incident involving female opposition party political candidates being 
thrown out of the polling station by the police.   The women’s attempt to obstruct what they 
claim to be the writing in of fraudulent information in electoral protocols by precinct officials 
is being witnessed by several people, who are patiently queuing at the polling desk to have 
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their identities checked or obtain the appropriate paperwork so they could cast their vote.  At 
some point one individual, a young man, steps out of the line and proclaims that he is happy 
to serve as witness to fraud, identifying himself as a voter.  There is apparently no connection 
between the party activists and the man.viii 
 
Moscow Carnegie Centre Democracy Data (employed in robustness checks) 
 
The composite index is constructed based on the following sub-indicators. The first is (1) 
regional political organization, an indicator evaluating the balance of powers between the 
executive and the legislative branches; the degree of independence of the courts and of law 
enforcement agencies, violations of citizens’ rights. The second sub-indicator is (2) openness 
of regional political life and the transparency of regional politics.  The third sub-indicator is 
(3) the democratic nature of elections at all levels.  It assesses the extent to which elections 
are free and fair, the extent of electoral competition, the occurrence of electoral 
manipulations and restrictions on active and passive electoral rights. The fourth, (4) political 
pluralism, sub-indicator, assesses aspects of the party political process like the stability of 
regional party system, representation of parties in regional parliaments and the presence of 
political coalitions. The fifth sub-indicator concerns (5) mass media, specifically the degree 
of its independence from federal and regional authorities. The sixth, (6) corruption sub-
indicator concerns the linkages between economic and political elites, the record of regional 
corruption scandals, etc. The seventh, (7) economic liberalization sub-indicator assess the 
extent of transparency of regional law and law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard 
to property rights. The eight, (8) civil society, sub-indicator assesses the extent of NGOs 
freedoms from regional authorities’ interference, the practice of regional referenda and public 
protest activity. The ninth, (9) elites, sub-indicator captures the extent of elite pluralism and 
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the presence of leader rotation mechanisms. The tenth, (10) municipal autonomy, sub-
indicator, captures the presence of elected municipal government institutions and the extent 
of their powers. (The data and discussion of the indices are available from: Sotsial’nyy atlas 
rossiyskikh regionov: Integral’nye indeksy: 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml#methods). The 2006-2010 scores are 
available from (Petrov and Titkov 2013).  
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Notes 
                                                          
i http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuKsnc6cl7g (accessed 14 February 2014). 
ii http://piter.tv/event/skandal_na_Optikov_ot_Go/ (accessed 14 February 2014). 
iii See video under the text titled “Neudachnaya popytka falsifikatsii, shkola No. 13” 
(unsuccessful attempt at electoral fraud, school No. 13) http://via-
midgard.info/news/in_russia/17074-falsifikacii-na-vyborax.html (accessed 14 February 
2014). 
iv See, for instance, the Krasnoyarsk section of the Wikipedia protests page: 
Ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/хронология_акций_протеста_против_фальсификации_выборов_в
_России_(2011-2012) (accessed 14 February 2014). 
v See, for example, details of officials implicated in fraud in particular districts: 
http://democrator.ru/complain/6045/6045 (accessed 14 February 2014). 
vi See, for instance, the Krasnoyarsk section of the Wikipedia protests page: 
Ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/хронология_акций_протеста_против_фальсификации_выборов_в
_России_(2011-2012) (accessed 14 February 2014). 
vii See, for instance, the Nizhniy Novgorod section of the Wikipedia protests page referring to 
a 10 December 2011 rally: 
Ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/хронология_акций_протеста_против_фальсификации_выборов_в
_России_(2011—2012); See also the following event descriptions from namarsh.ru: 
http://namarsh.ru/materials/4EEC79A27E200.html 
http://namarsh.ru/materials/4EF6D701C5831.html 
http://namarsh.ru/materials/4F5B1423124AE.html (accessed 15 February 2014). 
viii http://via-midgard.info/news/in_russia/17074-falsifikacii-na-vyborax.html (accessed 15 
February 2014). 
